A Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) scheme allows anyone to verify the validity of the shares computed and distributed by a dealer. The idea of PVSS was introduced by Stadler in [18] where he presented a PVSS scheme based on Discrete Logarithm. Later, several PVSS schemes were proposed. In [2], Behnad and Eghlidos present an interesting PVSS scheme with explicit membership and disputation processes. In this paper, we present a new PVSS having the advantage of being simpler while offering the same features.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method allowing splitting a secret between a set of participants such that only some predefined subsets of participants can recover the shared secret. These qualified subsets are called access structures. A secret sharing scheme proceeds in two phases: a dealing phase in which a dealer computes shares and gives to every participant his own share and a reconstruction phase that consists in trying to reconstruct the shared secret by pooling the elements of a qualified subset of shares.
Secret sharing schemes were introduced firstly and independently by Shamir [16] and Blakley [3] . The first scheme is based on polynomial interpolation while the latter is based on hyperplane geometry. Most of the proposed secret sharing schemes [1, 11] are based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Although its efficiency, Shamir's scheme still presents some problems. In fact, there is an absolute trust in the dealer. This latter, can distribute some inconsistent shares leading the participants to recover a secret which differs from the initial one. Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) schemes [5, 6, 13] were proposed to allow participants to verify the validity of the shares they received from the dealer. However, a malicious shareholder can receive a valid share but submit an invalid one in the reconstruction phase. Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) schemes [2, 4] , [8] [9] [10] , [14, 15] , [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] were proposed to solve this problem. In fact, PVSS schemes were proposed to prevent cheating by the dealer or/and the shareholders. In a PVSS scheme, the validity of the distributed shares can be verified by anyone.
In [2] , Behnad and Eghlidos present an interesting PVSS scheme where participants can prove their membership and the validity of their shares to prevent unauthorized parties from participating in the reconstruction process. Moreover, their scheme offers an explicit disputation process aiming to prove to a third party in conflict situations between the dealer and a participant who among them is lying.
In this paper, we present a new PVSS scheme providing a disputation and a membership proof processes. We show that our PVSS scheme is simpler than the PVSS scheme presented in [2] while still being as secure as the mentioned scheme. This paper is organized as follows: First, PVSS schemes are presented. After that, our new PVSS scheme is introduced. Then, the security of our PVSS scheme is studied and a comparison between it and the previous PVSS schemes is done. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks.
PVSS Schemes
PVSS schemes as introduced by Stadler in [18] aim to allow anyone, not only participants, to verify that shares were correctly distributed by the dealer. This property has been defined by Stadler in [18] and has been denoted public verifiability.
Stadler proposed in this paper, two PVSS schemes that can be used with general access structures. The first one is used for sharing a discrete logarithm. It requires a non standard assumption called DDLP "Double Discrete Logarithm Assumption". In fact, Stadler dealt with expressions of the form y = g (h x ) (with g a generator of a group of order p, and h a fixed element of high order in Z * p ) such that given y, it is hard to find x. Under this assumption, his scheme is as secure as the Decisional-DiffieHellman problem. The second one is based on the RSA root problem. It is used for sharing the n-th root and depends on the RSA assumption. Encryptions are based on a variant of the Diffie-Hellman keyexchange protocol. But we should notice here that the security of this scheme was not formally studied. Moreover, the verification in these two schemes requires information exchanges between the verifier and the shareholder. We say that it is an interactive verification.
In [8] , Fujisaki and Okamoto defined the non-interactivity for a PVSS scheme as the fact that the verification of a share can be done without communicating with the dealer or with any other participant. The scheme they proposed in [8] depends on the "modified RSA assumption" assuming that inverting the RSA function is still hard. This modified RSA assumption allows partial recovery.
Notice that the schemes of [8, 18] depend on some non standard assumptions. However, Schoenmakers provided in [15] a stronger PVSS scheme by adding the fact that when submitting his share, the shareholder must provide its correctness proof. His PVSS scheme is simpler than the previous schemes. It uses techniques working in any group for which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard. This scheme is as hard to break as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
In [20] , Young and Yung proposed an improvement of Schoenmakers's PVSS scheme. The scheme they proposed to share discrete logarithm is as hard as the Discrete Logarithm Problem itself. They proved in [21] that their scheme is computational zero-knowledge. In addition, in PVSS schemes, secure encryption assumptions are employed. But in their scheme, Young and Yung can use any probabilistic encryption function.
In [4] , Boudot and Traoré proposed new PVSS schemes allowing shareholders to recover their shares quickly (fast recovery) or after a predetermined amount of computations (delayed recovery). In fact, they provide a PVSS scheme for sharing discrete logarithm with fast recovery and a PVSS scheme for sharing factorization with fast recovery. They also present a PVSS scheme for sharing discrete logarithm with delayed recovery and a PVSS scheme for sharing factorization with delayed recovery.
In most of the existing PVSS schemes, the verification phase is interactive. This is due to the use of Fiat-Shamir zero knowledge protocol [7] . In [14] , Ruiz and Villar proposed a PVSS scheme with non interactive verification. It is the first efficient PVSS that does not use the Fiat-Shamir technique. It is based on the homomorphic properties of Paillier's encryption scheme [12] . It is the first known PVSS scheme based on the DCRA 1 (Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption). The verification process in this scheme is simpler than in the other known schemes.
In [9] , Heidarvand and Villar proposed a new PVSS scheme based on pairing. They took back the scheme of Shoenmakers using the pairing. The security of this scheme is based on the DBSDH 2 problem (Decisional Bilinear Square Diffie-Hellman problem). In [10] , Jhanwar proposed a new non-interactive PVSS scheme based on pairing. In this scheme, the dealer has not to compute and to distribute the shares of a given secret; he provides a set of private keys for participants. Then, every participant uses his private key, joined to another public value to compute his share.
Recently, other PVSS schemes have been proposed. In [21] , Yu and all proposed a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme with the possibility of enrollment. In [19] , Wu and all proposed a pairing based PVSS scheme reducing the computation cost while keeping the same security level of the existing public key systems.
Behnad and Eghlidos provided, in [2] , a PVSS scheme with non interactive verification and having two peculiarities. First, after distributing the shares and in case of any complaint from any participant, a third party can run a disputation process to identify who is lying. This third party can then vote against the dealer or against the participant. Second, Behnad and Eghlidos added a membership proof process in the beginning of the reconstruction phase. In this phase a shareholder has to prove his membership and the validity of his share at the same time. In [17] , Ben Shil, Blibech and Robbana proposed another PVSS scheme with a disputation and a membership proof processes. In this scheme, rather than publishing the encrypted coefficients of the polynomial used to compute the shares, the encrypted shares are published. Thus, the set of shares is public and any insertion or deletion will be detected by all the old participants. This scheme is, then, recommended for applications where the number of participants is limited while the access structure is dynamic and where it is worthy to keep a track of any change in the set of participants.
In this paper we introduce a new PVSS scheme providing a non-interactive verification process and presenting explicit disputation and membership processes. We show that our PVSS scheme is simpler than the schemes proposed in [2] and [17] while keeping the same level of security.
A new PVSS scheme
In our scheme, given two large prime numbers p and q such that q|p − 1 3 , the following notations are used:
-G q is a subgroup of prime order q in Z * p , such that computing discrete logarithm in this group is infeasible and g ∈ G q is a generator of the group.
In our PVSS scheme, we perform all the computations in Z q . 1 The Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption, used in the proof of the Paillier cryptosystem, says that given an integer z and a composite n, it is hard to decide whether z is a n-residue modulo n 2 or not.
2 Let e : G 1 * G 1 → G 2 a bilinear application such that G 1 and G 2 are two multiplicative group with the same order p. Let g be a generator of G 1 and a, b and z elements of Z * p . The Decisional Bilinear Square Diffie-Hellman (DBSDH) problem says that g a , g b and e(g, g) z is hard to decide whether e(g, g) a 2 b = e(g, g) z . 3 q divides p-1.
Dealing phase 3.1.1 Distribution process
In the distribution process, the dealer sets
Zq and F 0 is the secret to share. Moreover:
1. Every participant chooses a private key a i where a i ∈ R Zq and publishes g a i as his public key, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n where n is the number of participants.
2. The dealer D computes the shares s i = F(i), for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
He publishes
4. He sends an encrypted share E i = s i ⊕ (g a i ) s i to the participant Pr i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Notice that s 0 is the secret and thus there is no associated encrypted share to be sent to anyone).
Verification process
Every shareholder Pr i , computes
, then, verifies the following equality 5 :
Otherwise, the shareholder complains against the dealer.
Disputation process
In the case of any complaint, both the dealer D and the shareholder Pr i try to prove their honesty to a third party R. For doing that, D has to publish an encrypted value leading Pr i to extract g s i and to verify the validity of the associated share s i . If D sends an invalid share, Pr i has to prove this fact to R. This process is done using the following protocol:
1. Pr i chooses his private key a i and publishes his public key g a i . 
Pr i and D publish independently
g [(g a i ) s i ] −1 . Then, Ri = ∏ k−1 j=0 (C j ) i j .
D computes and publishes
, he sends a commitment to R and the disputation process is stopped. Else, he sends α to R.
R computes g α and verifies that
g α = ∏ k−1 j=0 (C j ) i j . Then, he verifies that g 1/(λ ⊕α) = g [(g a i ) s i ] −1 . If it holds, D lied else Pr i lied.
Reconstruction phase 3.2.1 Membership only proof
If a verifier wants to verify that Pr i is an authorized participant, this latter has to prove his membership to the verifier without revealing his share. Our membership proof is the following: 4 Randomly chosen. 5 Given C j = g F j , we compute:
1. The verifier chooses a ∈ R Zq and sends g a to the prover.
2. The prover sends R P = g [(g a ) s i ] −1 to the verifier.
The verifier computes
4. If R V = R P , the prover is the shareholder who possesses the share s i .
Pooling the shares
The secret is reconstructed from the submitted shares, as follows: s = ∑ k i=1 w i s i where w i = ∑ i = j i/( j −1). Notice that the shares can be submitted using the same encryption function of the distribution process
where a is the private key of the party concerned by the reconstruction of the secret and g a is its public key.
Notice also that this party does not need to run the membership process before the pooling phase since using this encryption function allows the verification of a share and its extraction at the same time.
Security
In this section, we prove the security properties of our PVSS scheme. First of all, we provide our definition of a secure PVSS scheme:
Definition A PVSS scheme is secure if and only if:
-During the dealing phase, neither the dealer D can cheat by sending an invalid share to a given participant Pr i , nor the participant Pr i can claim that he received a non valid share while it was.
-During the reconstruction phase, an unauthorized party cannot pretend to be a shareholder.
-During all the stages of the scheme, the secrecy property is verified.
Let's prove at first that, in our scheme, the dealer D cannot cheat by sending an invalid share to the participant Pr i . We show here that Pr i can prove this fact to the third party R in the disputation phase. Thus, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1 "The dealer D cannot cheat by sending an invalid share to the participant Pr i ".
Proof In the disputation phase, a honest dealer has to compute λ = s i ⊕ (g a i ) s i . But a malicious dealer can have another behavior. In fact, he can compute λ using an invalid share s i or an incorrect value g a i rather than the public key g a i of the participant Pr i .
So, there are seven values of λ that D can use:
In each of these cases, Pr i will compute α = λ ⊕ (g s i ) a i at step 3 of the disputation process, and since λ = s i ⊕ (g a i ) s i , he will find α = s i and he will send this value to R. R will verify that
We prove also that, in our scheme, a malicious behavior of a participant Pr i , who received a valid share from the dealer D, but claims that his share is invalid, will be detected. We show here that, in the disputation phase, the dealer D can prove to a third party R that Pr i cheated. Thus, we prove the following lemma:
Proof In the disputation phase, if a participant Pr i received a correct share s i but claims that he received an invalid one, he has to send a fake value α to R. In fact, Pr i computes α = λ ⊕ (g s i ) a i but sends α = α to R. So, R computes, g α and verifies that it is not a public value. Then, R verifies, at step 5 of the disputation process, that g 1/(λ ⊕α ) = g [(g a i ) s i ] −1 . Since it does hold, R concludes that Pr i lied.
In addition, we prove the following lemma: Lemma 4.3 "Under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, it is infeasible to break the encryption of the shares".
Proof Breaking the encryption of the shares is equivalent to computing s i from the encrypted share
To be able to do that, we have to compute s i = E i ⊕ (g a i ) s i from the inputs E i , g a i , g s i . This implies computing g a i * s i given g a i and g s i .
Recall that the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that it is infeasible to compute g a i * s i given g a i and g s i . Therefore the unauthorized party is not able to compute the share s i .
Furthermore, to break the encryption of a share s i , the adversary should be able to compute s i from g s i . This implies solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Given that computing the discrete log in G q is infeasible, the unauthorized party is not able to compute s i from g s i .
Then, we prove the following lemma: Proof To extract the share s i , the adversary has to compute s i from the public masked value λ = s i ⊕ g a i * s i . This implies that he needs to compute s i = λ ⊕ g a i * s i given λ , g a i and g s i .
For doing that, the adversary should be able to compute g a i * s i from the inputs g a i and g s i . However, the adversary is not able to compute s i due to the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
We prove also that: Moreover, we prove that: Lemma 4.6 "Under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, an unauthorized party cannot pretend to be a shareholder".
Proof This feature is fulfilled within the membership process. In this process, to pretend to be the shareholder possessing s i , the unauthorized party should be able to compute (g a i ) s i from the values g a i and g s i in the membership process. However, under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, this is infeasible.
Finally, we prove that: Lemma 4.7 "Under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, it is infeasible to break the encryption of the shares submitted in the reconstruction phase".
Proof In the reconstruction phase, only the party possessing the private key a can extract the share s i from the encrypted value E i = s i ⊕ (g a ) s i . This party has just to compute
For a dishonest party knowing only E i , g a and g s i , breaking the encryption of the shares means computing (g a ) s i from the public value g s i and the public key g a which is infeasible under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
In this section, we proved that neither the dealer can cheat by distributing invalid shares nor a dishonest participant can cheat by claiming that the share he received is not valid while it was. Moreover, we proved that under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, no one can break the encryption of the shares neither in the distribution process, nor in the disputation process or in the reconstruction phase. We proved also that, under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, an unauthorized party cannot pretend to be a shareholder possessing a valid share.
In the following section, we compare our new PVSS scheme to the PVSS schemes presented in section 2.
Comparison with previous PVSS schemes
In this section, in order to compare our PVSS scheme to the existent PVSS schemes, we first present the different security properties of the most known schemes. We point that the schemes proposed in [12] and [18] do not appear in this section because we consider that these schemes have a specific context 6 . However, we include the scheme of Feldman [6] in this comparison since we consider that it is the first PVSS scheme, although public verifiability was not defined yet when this scheme was proposed. So, for each studied PVSS scheme, we identify the cryptographic techniques it uses in every process (distribution, verification. . . ) and we verify if they satisfy our definition of security. Since most of the used cryptographic techniques are based on some hard problems, we classify these hard problems into four classes:
• Discrete Logarithms: Hard problems based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
• Factoring : Hard problems based on the Factorization Problem.
• Paillier's cryptosystem: Hard problems based on the Paillier's cryptosystem proof.
• Pairings: Hard problems based on the Bilinear Pairings.
As we said before, a comparison is done for every process of PVSS schemes. For the distribution process, we study the security assumptions (DLP 7 , CDH 8 , ...) of the encryption functions used to encrypt the shares before distributing them among the set of participants. Then, we evaluate the problem on which the security of the process is based. The evaluation is based on the following reduction: ELGamal ≤ P CDH ≤ P DLP.
However, for the scheme of Feldman and the scheme of Young and Yung, this evaluation is infeasible, because the cryptographic techniques used in these schemes are not specified. For more details, see table1. For the verification process, we explicit also the problem on which the security of the verification process is based. This evaluation is based on the following reductions:
Encryption and distribution of shares
• ELGamal ≤ P CDH ≤ P DLP.
• RSA ≤ P Factoring.
We also classify the verification process into two classes: interactive verification and non-interactive verification. The verification is interactive if the verifier has to communicate with other participants and/or with the dealer to verify the validity of a share. It is non-interactive if the verifier can verify the validity of a share without any communication with other participants or with the dealer. Obviously, non-interactivity is preferred in order to reduce communications. For more details, see table 4.
After the verification process, a participant can initiate a disputation process to complain about the validity of the share he received. The disputation process aims to verify if the dealer is honest. We say that this process is explicit if it leads the dealer to send the share to the participant who complains in the presence of a third party. This latter has to identify who among the dealer and the participant is lying. Otherwise, the disputation process is supposed to be implicit (the dealer is considered as dishonest if the number of participants complaining about the validity of their shares is greater than a given parameter). Notice that only the three schemes of table 2 offer an explicit disputation process. The security assumptions of this process for these schemes are studied in The membership proof can be implicit (a participant has to give his part, in the reconstruction process, to prove that he is an authorized participant) or explicit (a participant can prove to a verifier that he is an authorized participant possessing a valid share without revealing this share). When this process is explicit, it can be interactive or non-interactive. In table 3, we focus on PVSS schemes with explicit membership proof process and study the interactivity of each process and its security assumptions.
To summarize, we provide in this paper a new PVSS scheme having the following properties: First, during the distribution process, our scheme uses a simple encryption function to encrypt the shares before distributing them. The encryption of the shares is secure under the CDH assumption.
When he receives a share of the secret, a participant can extract and verify the validity of his share without any communication with any party, even the dealer. We say that our verification process is non-interactive.
In case of any complaint against the dealer, the concerned participant, the dealer and a third party R can run a disputation process in order to establish who is cheating. The disputation process is secure under the CDH assumption.
Later, an explicit Zero-Knowledge membership process can be run to allow every participant to prove interactively his membership to a verifier who asked for that. This process is secure under the CDH assumption. Notice here that only three schemes offer an explicit membership proof and an explicit disputation process at the same time: the present scheme, the scheme of Behnad and Eghlidos [2] and the scheme of Ben Shil, Blibech and Robbana [17] .
Moreover, notice that in our scheme, when submitting an encrypted share to the party concerned by computing the secret, an implicit membership proof is given and it is not necessary to run the explicit membership only proof.
Finally, we point that the use of the XOR operator in our scheme makes it less timeconsuming than the schemes presented in [2] and [17] .
Conclusion
The new PVSS scheme proposed in this paper is very simple while being secure. In fact, thanks to the use of a simple encryption function, we reduce computations in all the processes of the scheme. In addition, like in the scheme proposed in [2] we added two new processes: a disputation process and a membership proof process. Thanks to these processes, no one can cheat.
